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SOME REALISM ABOUT JUDGES: 
A REPLY TO EDWARDS AND LIVERMORE 
RICHARD A. POSNER† 
 For some years I have been arguing for a realistic approach to 
understanding judicial behavior.1 That approach is challenged in a 
recent article by Judge Harry Edwards of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit and Mr. Michael Livermore, the executive 
director of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University 
School of Law.2 
What I am calling the “realistic approach” is, most simply, the 
view that judges play a legislative role in many cases, and those 
usually the most important ones—the ones that shape the law or have 
an immediate effect on society. And they play that role not only in 
common law cases and other areas of explicitly judge-made law but 
also in the interpretation of statutes and—of course—of the U.S. 
Constitution. The opposing approach, which I call the “legalistic 
approach,” pictures judges as oracles, engaged in applying law stated 
in orthodox legal sources, such as statutory or constitutional text or 
judicial decisions having the status of precedents, and doctrines built 
from those decisions, to the facts of new cases. Judges in this picture 
are transmitters of law, not creators, just as the oracle at Delphi was 
 
Copyright © 2010 by Richard A. Posner. 
 † Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of 
Chicago Law School. This Reply is a revised draft of a talk given on September 25, 2009 at a 
conference on political science and law held at Northwestern University Law School’s Searle 
Center. An earlier draft of the Reply was given at faculty workshops at Harvard and Yale Law 
Schools, and the Author thanks the participants at the workshops for their comments, as well as 
Lee Epstein for her very helpful comments on the earlier draft. 
 1. See, for example, my article, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
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the passive transmitter of Apollo’s prophecies. The analogy of judge 
to oracle was Blackstone’s, who went so far as to argue that even 
common law judges were oracles, engaged in translating immemorial 
custom into legal doctrines rather than in legislating doctrines.3 
The realistic view goes back to Plato’s dialogue Gorgias—before 
there even was a legal profession or professional judges; we find it in 
Bentham, famously in Holmes (and less bluntly in Cardozo), in legal 
realism, later in political science, and then in economics and in critical 
legal studies. Though Holmes is venerated by lawyers and judges, the 
legalistic view continues to dominate professional discourse about 
judging. The reason is that lawyers and judges—particularly judges—
like to think that judicial decisionmaking is an “objective” activity, 
that decisions are produced by analysis. No one today thinks the 
process wholly oracular. But the idea of the judge as an analyst shares 
with the idea of the judge as an oracle the assumption that legal 
questions always have right answers: answers that can be produced by 
transmission from an authoritative source, though in the modern view 
the transmission is not direct but is mediated by analysis. And the 
judge remains an oracle in the sense that his personality does not 
count. The personality of the oracle at Delphi was no more important 
than the personality of a coaxial cable. To the legalist, a judge is a 
calculating machine. To the realist, he or she is a typical human being, 
whose judicial votes, because they are not generated by a process that 
resembles the operation of the scientific method or the rules of logic, 
are influenced by life experiences, professional training and 
experiences, political ideology, temperament, personal-identity 
characteristics such as race and sex, energy, ambition, sentiment, taste 
for leisure or for hard work, cognitive quirks, training and 
intelligence, and the other influences on human behavior. Out of 
these elements some judges (and more law professors) have built 
elaborate theories—law as the quest for original meanings, law as 
active liberty, law as libertarianism, law as integrity, and so forth—but 
these the realist regards more as rationalizations of dispositions than 
as theories that actually guide decisions and can be verified or 
refuted, rather than simply accepted or rejected. 
The realistic approach to judicial behavior is challenged in the 
article by Judge Edwards and Mr. Livermore, to which I now turn. I 
will not try to go through the article page by page, registering my 
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disagreement with the points made by the authors; with many of their 
points I have no disagreement. I will confine this reply to the seven 
points with which I disagree. 
1. Legalistically Indeterminate Cases Shape the Law.  The authors 
say that the realists exaggerate the degree to which judges are unable 
to achieve agreement through deliberation that, overriding 
ideological and other differences, generates an objectively correct 
decision. Their evidence for the charge of exaggeration is that even in 
the Supreme Court many decisions are unanimous though the 
Justices are ideologically diverse; and “many” becomes “most” in the 
federal courts of appeals4 (I do not know the situation in the state 
court system). 
But no realist has ever denied that most judicial decisions are 
legalistic. Legalism is a category of realistic judicial decisionmaking. 
Legalistic doctrines such as plain meaning and stare decisis enable 
judges to economize on their time and effort; to minimize controversy 
with other branches of government by appearing to play a modest, 
technical, “professional” role (in the sense in which members of 
professions seek deference from the laity on the basis of their real or 
pretended specialized knowledge); and to provide a product—
reasonably predictable law—that is socially valued and therefore 
justifies the judges’ privileges. I do not doubt moreover that some 
judges think that every case, however novel and difficult, can be 
resolved by reference to an authoritative text, statutory (or 
constitutional) or judicial. But realism, or at least the form of realism 
that I defend, is not a theory of judicial self-consciousness. Whatever 
judges think they are doing, they cannot resolve a novel case 
legalistically because a novel case is one to which the orthodox legal 
materials of text and precedent do not speak beyond furnishing ideas 
of policy that might be used to “legislate” the outcome of the novel 
case. 
The mistake in equating unanimity (absence of published 
dissent) with agreement is that judges do not always dissent publicly 
from a decision with which they disagree. I have discussed what I call 
“dissent aversion”5
 
elsewhere and will not repeat the discussion here. 
 
 4. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1941–44. 
 5. POSNER, supra note 1, at 32–34; see also Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (Nov. 13, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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A more important point (since dissent aversion is much less 
pronounced in the Supreme Court than in the courts of appeals) is 
that the cases that can be decided by the methods of legalism are not 
the cases that shape the law, the novel cases. Today’s law, insofar as it 
is the product of judicial decisions, is the product of decisions that 
were stabs in the dark rather than applications of settled law. Some of 
those cases were unanimous, such as Brown v. Board of Education,6 
but that decision was not arrived at by legalistic analysis and could 
not have been. It was the product of political agreement—a shared 
repugnance to racial segregation viewed as antithetical to evolving 
American values. 
Even Judge Edwards says that 5 to 15 percent of cases decided 
by his court are indeterminate from a legalist standpoint.7 If one 
cumulates those figures over many years and many courts, it is 
apparent that an immense number of decisions are legalistically 
indeterminate; and among them, as I have said, are the decisions that 
have made the law what it is today. (Just compare the text of the 
Constitution with the body of modern constitutional doctrine, or for 
that matter the text of the Sherman Act with the body of modern 
antitrust law.) 
2. Proxy Problems.  The authors point out that the standard 
realist variable in empirical studies of judicial behavior—the party of 
the president who appointed the judge who cast the vote in 
question—explains only a fraction of judges’ votes.8
 
And that is true. 
It is true because the variable is a crude proxy for ideological leanings 
(in part because the political parties are not ideologically uniform), 
and no proxy at all for the other nonlegalistic factors that I 
mentioned, such as background and temperament, that influence 
judicial votes. Yet despite its crudeness, the proxy has been found in 
numerous studies to have significant explanatory effect, even after 
correcting for other variables that might influence a judge’s votes.9 
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 8. Id. at 1942. 
 9. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 151 (2006); Christina L. 
Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 
AM. J. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 20 n.3), available at http://epstein.law. 
northwestern.edu/research/genderjudging.html; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 786 (2009); Daniel R. 
Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. 
J. 219, 243 (1999). 
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3. Judicial Self-Reporting.  Judge Edwards in his part of the joint 
paper gives heavy weight to what judges—in fact, to what Judge 
Edwards—reports about how they decide to vote in a case as they 
do.10 The assumption is that judicial self-reporting—judicial 
introspection—is a valid source of knowledge. I am skeptical, 
especially when it conforms closely to the “party line” on judicial 
decisionmaking. For largely political reasons—mainly to avoid 
seeming to compete with the other branches of government in making 
policy—most judges most of the time downpedal the creative or 
legislative role in judging. Sometimes the parade of modesty becomes 
ludicrous, as when John Roberts at his confirmation hearing said that 
the role of a Supreme Court Justice, which he would faithfully 
inhabit, was similar to that of a baseball umpire who calls balls and 
strikes but does not make or alter the rules of baseball.11 That was so 
ridiculous, and Chief Justice Roberts is so sophisticated, that it cannot 
be what he actually thought. I am not suggesting that he is 
hypocritical. Judicial confirmation hearings have become a farce in 
which a display of candor would be suicide. It would also be a 
mistake. It would be to commit what philosophers call a “category 
mistake.” It would be equivalent to a Shakespearean actor 
interrupting his recital of Hamlet’s “To be, or not to be” soliloquy by 
saying that he did not actually think that death was “a consummation 
devoutly to be wished”; he was just saying it because it was in the 
script he had been given. 
But much of the judicial self-reporting is, I think, sincere, though 
not, by virtue of that, reliable; we have all heard of “cognitive 
dissonance” and how people will fool themselves in order to erase it. 
There is a well-defined “official” judicial role and most judges would 
be uncomfortable if they realized that in reality they were playing a 
different role. So they suppress the realization. My earlier example 
was of a judge who can think in legalist categories, and so when he 
votes in a novel case, a case that does not fit those categories, he is 
legislating unconsciously. 
I do not deny that judicial introspection can play a valid role in 
studies of judicial behavior. But it could do so only as a source of 
hypotheses to be tested. Many of my own views about judicial 
 
 10. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1950–58. 
 11. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
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behavior were arrived at by introspection, but I do not expect anyone 
to be convinced by them unless I present evidence; my say-so is not 
evidence and neither is Judge Edwards’s. 
4. Rhetoric Is Weak Evidence.  A related point made in defense 
of the legalist approach as a description of actual judicial behavior is 
that most judicial opinions are legalistic in style. They cite prior 
decisions as if those decisions really were binding, reason by analogy, 
give great weight to statutory and even constitutional language, delve 
into history for clues to original meaning, and so forth. But that is 
what one would expect if most judges think of themselves as legalists; 
or if most judicial opinions are largely written by law clerks (as they 
are), who are inveterate legalists because they lack the experience or 
confidence or “voice” to write a legislative opinion of the kind that 
Holmes, Cardozo, Hand, Jackson, Traynor, or Friendly wrote; or if 
judges think the legalist pose politically useful, as conveying a 
becoming modesty and avoiding conflict with rival branches of 
government. Judges have political reasons to represent creativity as 
continuity, and innovation as constraint; and as there is no recognized 
duty of candor in judicial opinion writing, they cannot be accused of 
hypocrisy in writing that way even if they are aware that it does not 
track their actual decisional process. 
5. Law Suffused with Politics.  The strongest rhetorical move by 
legalists is to call the legalist approach “law” and the realist approach 
“politics.” It is effective rhetoric because it makes a “realist” judge 
seem like someone who flouts the judicial oath—which requires a 
judge to uphold the law—and thus a usurper, and realist discourse a 
blueprint for usurpation. 
But this rhetoric reflects and perpetuates a misunderstanding of 
the nature of American law. That law is suffused with politics (in the 
ideological rather than the partisan sense—few federal judges have, 
or at least exhibit in their decisions, a strong sense of party loyalty). 
Constitutional law, which is law made by the Supreme Court by loose 
interpretation of the antiquated constitutional text, is political in the 
sense of being the product not of orthodox legal materials 
(authoritative text plus precedents) but of the values, political in a 
broad (but sometimes in a rather narrow) sense, of the Justices. That 
does not make their decisions “lawless.” The primary duty of a judge 
is to decide cases, and this duty is not waived merely because the 
judge confronts a case, as he often will, that cannot be decided simply 
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by reference to orthodox judicial materials—that can be decided only 
by making a value or policy choice, a choice that inevitably will be 
influenced by political ideology, career and personal background, and 
a variety of psychological factors. The critics of the realist approach 
either do not acknowledge these obvious facts about the American 
judicial system or are unable to come up with a competing theory of 
judicial motivations. 
Judge Edwards and Mr. Livermore, however, do not make this 
mistake. Judge Edwards acknowledges that the American conception 
of law “encompasses, at least in some circumstances, forms of moral 
or political reasoning.”12
 
But why does he call it “reasoning”? What 
exactly is moral and political reasoning? Edwards does not explain. 
Had he said moral and political beliefs, we would be in agreement. 
Such beliefs are less likely to be the product of a reasoning process 
than of temperament, upbringing, religious affiliation, personal and 
professional experiences, and characteristics of personal identity such 
as race and sex.13 
6. Exaggerated Significance of Deliberation.  Recognizing though 
he does that there is a considerable area of indeterminacy in law 
viewed from a legalistic perspective, Judge Edwards falls back on the 
idea of deliberation as a way of overcoming indeterminacy.14
 
I think 
he exaggerates the significance of judicial deliberation. I note that 
until quite recently, English judges did not engage in deliberation—
they were forbidden to do so by the rule of “orality”: everything a 
judge did was to be done in public so that the public could monitor 
judicial behavior.15 Yet the product of these nondeliberating judges 
was highly regarded; nor am I aware that the decline of orality in the 
English legal system—a product of increased workload—has 
improved the system. (In fairness, though, the extreme length of 
English appellate proceedings by U.S. standards may have provided a 
substitute for deliberation—each judge on the appellate panel had 
 
 12. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1900; see also id. at 1898–901, 1946 (“[S]ome 
play for inherently contestable political judgments is simply built into law and strikes us as a 
normal constituent of good judging.”). 
 13. See my book, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999), for a 
skeptical account of moral reasoning. 
 14. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1949. 
 15. See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED 
STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 101–03 (1990). 
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much more time than his American counterpart to think about a 
case.) 
The problem with judicial deliberation in the American context 
is the heterogeneity of American judiciaries. Judges do not select 
their colleagues or successors; nor are the judges of a court selected 
for the same reasons or on the basis of the same criteria. Even when 
all the judges on an appellate panel were appointed by the same 
president (which is infrequent), the appointments will have been 
influenced by considerations that are unrelated to the likelihood that 
the appointees will form a coherent deliberating entity—
considerations such as the recommendations of a Senator, the quest 
for diversity, even political services, and campaign contributions. 
Further evidence for my reservations concerning the 
productiveness of judicial deliberation is the curiously stilted 
character of deliberation. The judges speak their piece, usually 
culminating in a statement of the vote they are casting, either in order 
of seniority or reverse order of seniority, depending on the court, and 
it is a serious breach of etiquette to interrupt a judge when he has the 
floor. This structured discussion reflects the potential awkwardness of 
a freewheeling discussion among persons who are not entirely 
comfortable arguing with each other because they were not picked to 
form an effective committee, and, as an aspect of the diversity that 
results from the considerations that shape judicial appointments, may 
have sensitivities that inhibit discussion of relevant issues involving 
race, sex, religion, criminal rights, immigrants’ rights, and other areas 
that arouse strong emotions. Judicial deliberation can be highly 
productive when the issues discussed are technical in character, rather 
than entangled with moral or political questions frank discussion of 
which is likely to produce animosity—but cases that raise issues that 
all the judges agree are technical tend not to be the cases that shape 
the law, that make it what it is. 
7. Why Should Judges Be Legalists?  The legalists, while strongly 
committed to the view that most judges are legalists, do not offer a 
theory of why it is plausible to expect judges in our system to be 
legalists. Anyone who has studied professional behavior, including 
the behavior of academics, knows that self-interest, along with 
personality and, yes, in many fields (including law!), politics plays a 
role in their behavior. Why would we not expect that to be true with 
respect to judges? Are they saints by birth or continuous prayer? Are 
they made saints by being appointed to the bench? Does a politicized 
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selection process select for saints? Does putting on the robe change 
the man or woman under it? The realistic view of judges is that they 
care about the same things that other people care about, including 
salary, benefits, how hard they work, and how well they are treated 
by their colleagues. They thus have “leisure preference” and “effort 
aversion,” but also a desire to be respected and influential. They thus 
respond to incentives and constraints, like other people; from the 
assumption that they are like other people, the hypotheses of the 
realistic approach derive. The effects of lifetime tenure must surely be 
factored in when modeling judicial behavior. The critics have not 
explained how it is that federal judges are made over into baseball 
umpires. 
There are expectations concerning the judicial role; there is a 
degree of self-selection and, in any event, persons uncomfortable in 
the role are unlikely to seek a judgeship or remain a judge; there is an 
appreciation for legal values that is inculcated by legal training and 
reinforced by experience as a lawyer. Judges are not just like other 
people, or, in what I have described as their “legislative” role, just 
like members of Congress. But a properly nuanced model of self-
interested human behavior can, I believe, explain much of what they 
do in their judicial role. 
To conclude this brief response: Much but by no means all of the 
apparent disagreement dissolves if proper weight is given to 
concessions on both sides. I concede and indeed would emphasize 
that most judicial decisions are indeed “legalistic,” but would add 
merely that legalistic decisionmaking is consistent with realism. I 
further concede, appealing to the concept of cognitive dissonance, 
that most judges do not think of themselves in “realist” terms; but I 
regard judicial introspection as a source of hypotheses about judicial 
behavior rather than as evidence for the best explanation of that 
behavior. And I insist that one must distinguish between the rhetoric 
and the reality of judicial decisionmaking. But I certainly agree that 
the political party of the appointing president is an exceedingly crude 
proxy for the values that drive judicial decisionmaking in legalistically 
indeterminate cases—yet, crude as it is, it has, as I mentioned earlier, 
considerable explanatory value—which is inconsistent with the 
legalistic view of judicial decisionmaking. And it is also improvable.16 
 
 16. See, e.g., Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal 
Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 628 (2001). 
POSNER IN FINAL 2/11/2010  12:13:35 AM 
1186 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1177 
The authors in their turn concede that a significant fraction of all 
appellate cases cannot be resolved by an approximation to deduction 
from the orthodox legal materials of text and precedent, but only by 
appeal to moral and political considerations.17
 
(I consider their 5 to 15 
percent estimate of such cases high!) 
The residual difference between us appears to be twofold. Judge 
Edwards and Mr. Livermore overstate (I believe) the role of 
deliberation in judicial decisionmaking, and, a closely related point, 
the possibility of objective moral and political reasoning. Moral and 
political reasoning as generally practiced, certainly at the judicial 
level, is not an analytic process, but an expression of values shaped by 
temperament, personal experiences, and religious and political 
beliefs. Deliberation will not bridge the interpersonal gaps created by 
value disagreements in a morally heterogeneous society. 
 
 17. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1898. 
